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Abstract. We define the problem of group identification in a fuzzy en-
vironment. We concentrate on the case where the society is required
to self-determine the belongingness of each member to a specific group,
characterized by a single attribute. In general terms, this case consists
of a collective identity issue that can be regarded as an aggregation pro-
blem of individual assessments within a group. Here we introduce the
possibility that both the original assessments and the resulting output
attach partial memberships to the collectivity, for each potential mem-
ber. We propose relevant classes of rules, and some are axiomatically
characterized. Our new approach provides a way to circumvent classical
impossibility results like Kasher and Rubinstein’s.
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tity function; Choquet Fuzzy collective identity function; WOWA-Fuzzy
collective identity function.
1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to extend the study of the group identification pro-
blem in Social Choice by allowing the natural possibility of partial membership
degrees of the individuals to the groups. To be more precise in this first work we
focus on a clear-cut statement called the problem of collective identity.
In this regard we adhere to Kasher [23], who introduces a notion of collec-
tive identity that remains basically unchallenged. It first attempts to answer the
question of how to define a social group, albeit in a non-formalized sense. Kasher
and Rubinstein [24] build on this philosophical position and state the problem
from the point of view of Social Choice. To this purpose, they pose the question
as an aggregation problem where the views of every member of the society about
every member determine a well-defined collective identity of the group. In formal
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terms, the social outcome of their problem is a (crisp) subset of the society. The
success of their contribution is that they show how algebraic aggregation theory
(cf., Rubinstein and Fishburn [31]) intervenes to provide answers to such prob-
lem about aggregation of individual opinions. Among other achievements, they
prove a celebrated impossibility theorem under fairly mild conditions. Therefore
although the use of aggregators (in the sense of [23] or [24]) and of aggregation
operators (e.g., in the algebraic framework posed by [31] in economic theory) is
not the same, the first relates to the second at the outset.
Clearly, an inspection of the relevant literature shows that the modeling of
how individuals in a society are collectively viewed as belonging to a group
is naturally linked to vague attributes, e.g., ‘belonging to a newly formed na-
tionality’ (Dimitrov, Sung and Xu [16]), ‘being Jewish’ (Kasher [23]), ‘being
African-American’ or belonging to any racial group (Miller, [28]), ‘living in a rich
neighborhood’ (Dimitrov [14]), etc. Nevertheless the Social Choice literature has
almost universally neglected this fact in the analysis of how social groups should
be defined. By incorporating the subjectivity associated with general and vague
attributes in the form of partial memberships we provide a richer environment
where either the personal views of the individuals or the resulting collective
identity or both are not necessarily dichotomic any more. In this framework we
can better capture the subtleties of the problem, also because new families of
aggregation operators can be employed to determine the social outcome (which
can now be a fuzzy subset of the society).
Regarding this issue, besides the few traditional aggregation rules from the
Social Choice literature we introduce the discrete Choquet integral, ordered
weighted averaging operators (OWA), and weighted OWA operators (WOWA)
as new tools that may determine the degree of memberships of the individuals
to the collective identity. We utilize these aggregation functions due to their
versatility and their well-known properties, that we proceed to briefly review.3
The Choquet integral is the integral of a real function with respect to a fuzzy
measure, by analogy with the Lebesgue integral which is defined with respect
to an ordinary (i.e., additive) measure. Under the premise that the measure of
the whole set is one, the discrete Choquet integral can be regarded as a mean or
an averaging aggregation operator. In fact Marichal [26] presents the Choquet
integral as an appropriate extension to the weighted arithmetic mean for the
aggregation of criteria. Although it offers a large flexibility, somehow it keeps
a linear form. Marichal proves how the Choquet integral can be characterized
axiomatically by means of natural properties in [26, Section IV.B]. He offers an
intuitive approach to it in [26, Section IV.A]. Several graphical interpretations of
the Choquet integral are available from the literature, e.g., in Grabisch et al. [21]
and Torra and Narukawa [37]. Earlier uses of Choquet integrals as aggregation
functions in other contexts can be found e.g., in Calvo, Mayor and Mesiar [9,
3 Other developments on collective aggregation of fuzzy sets or fuzzy relations from
Decision Making literature can be found in Barret [5], Barret, Pattanaik and Salles
[6], Dubois and Koning [17] and Montero [29], among others,
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pp. 224–244], Grabisch [18], Grabisch et al. [19], Grabisch and Labreuche [20],
and Marichal [27].
A particular instance of the discrete Choquet integral is the OWA operator
(cf., Yager [38]). It is similar to a weighted mean, which synthesizes the values of
the information sources according to their respective reliabilities, the difference
being that in OWAs the values of the variables are previously ordered in a
decreasing way. Therefore now the weights are not associated with concrete
variables, and OWAs can diminish the importance of extreme values in order to
increase the relevance of central ones. Calvo, Mayor and Mesiar [9], de Andre´s
Calle et al. [13], Llamazares [25] (in the context of Social Choice), and Yager
and Kacprzyk [40] among others supply examples of applications of the OWA
operator. From the point of view of the aggregation of opinions, it preserves
anonymity while keeping the attractive of different weights.
An aggregation procedure that combines the advantages of using weights
both to discriminate the sources of information and to calibrate the relevance
of values in relation to their relative position is the WOWA operator (cf., Torra
[34]). This procedure relies on an interpolation method (see also Torra [35]).
We can now be more explicit about the main target of this paper. We provide
evidences that extending the analysis of the problem of collective identity by
the introduction of partial memberships permits to better capture the nuances
of preference modeling. Several frameworks apropos the fuzzy environment are
presented and their properties are studied. We show that it is possible to preserve
the nature of the investigations in Social Choice (e.g., the axiomatic treatment
of the models) and to avoid restrictions imposed by the dichotomic viewpoint of
the problem. We prove these benefits by characterizing the rules that evaluate
each individual’s membership to the collectivity by a discrete Choquet integral,
and by producing a positive escape from Kasher and Rubinstein’s impossibility
theorem.
The outline of our exposition is as follows. Section 2 explains the origin of the
problem, its antecedents, and the precise framework in terms of crisp or cate-
gorical opinions that we investigate. In Section 3 we define our model for the
fuzzy collective identity problem, allowing for various degrees of generalization.
Our main tool of analysis, namely, fuzzy collective identity functions (FCIFs), is
put forward and some direct examples are presented which extend the traditional
collective identity functions. Then in Section 4 we propose a newly designed
approach which determines belongingness to the collectivity by Choquet-FCIFs
or WOWA-FCIFs. Both include interesting particular cases like OWA-FCIFs,
the average mean FCIF, or weighted mean FCIFs. We import properties of the
corresponding aggregation operators in order to derive properties of these FCIFs.
Some examples illustrate their use too. In Section 5 we set out some general con-
clusions as well as a possible circumvention of Kasher and Rubinstein’s impossi-
bility theorem. In addition we provide a characterization of Choquet-FCIFs that
derives from a known axiomatization of the discrete Choquet integral. Moreover,
we present several ideas for future research.
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2 Antecedent and current state of the problem
The problem of the identification and qualification of individuals is one of the
main issues in social and economic contexts. In this section we give an overview
of how the problem has been addressed in this literature and then formalize the
framework that motivates our study.
2.1 Related literature
Kasher [23] first analyzes the collective identity question from a philosophical
perspective but recognizes it as an aggregation problem of individual assess-
ments. Every agent in a society gives their opinion on herself/himself and other
agents regarding a particular attribute4. Then an aggregation function deter-
mines the agents belonging to the collective in a recursive procedure, taking into
account their individual views5.
Subsequently, Kasher and Rubinstein [24] establish a link between the con-
cept of collective identity proposed by Kasher and the algebraic theory of aggre-
gators. These authors provide axiomatic characterizations for three extreme
aggregation rules: the strong liberal, the dictatorships and the oligarchical rule.
Saporiti [33] gives a direct proof of the characterization of dictatorial rules in
the tradition of earlier proofs of Arrow’s impossibility theorem [2].
Samet and Schmeidler [32] study and characterize a class of voting rules,
called consent rules. These rules incorporate aspects of majoritarianism and
liberalism. They follow [24] to study the relation between the liberal and the
majoritarian rules in the same mode.
In relation with the problem of endogeneos classification, already Kasher
and Rubinstein [24, Section 6] consider the environment where every person
has a position about how the society should be partitioned into non-ranked
classes. In this respect the group identification problem addresses the issue of
constructing a decomposition of the group into classes from such profiles. Some
scholars have studied the case in which the number of classes is fixed (but not
necessarily reduced to two as in the collective identity problem), e.g., Houy [22,
Section 2] and Miller [28]. Others have been concerned with the case in which
the individuals only express their wishes about who should be put together in
the same classes, e.g., the aforementioned Kasher and Rubinstein [24, Section
6], Houy [22, Section 3] and Dimitrov and Puppe [15].
Some other contributions include Ballester and Garc´ıa-Lapresta [3], Billot [7],
C¸engelci and Sanver [10], or Dimitrov, Sung and Xu [16]. Table 1 summarizes
these and other works. Dimitrov [14] constitutes a nice survey of the various
approaches to the group identification problem.
Now we discuss the common framework in the aforementioned contributions.
4 Kasher focuses on Jewish identity.
5 Kasher only considers aggregation methods that satisfy Rawls’ justice principle [30].
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Collective Identity (one attribute characterizes
identity)
Author(s)/Year Decision Rules
Kasher [23], 1993 Philosophical point of view
Kasher and Rubinstein [24], 1997 Liberal and Dictatorial
Samet and Schmeidler [32], 2003 Consent rules, Liberal (2 axiomatizations)
Billot [7], 2003 Qualification
Dimitrov et. al [16], 2007 Consensus-start-respecting
and Liberal-start-respecting
Ballester and Garc´ıa-Lapresta [3], 2008 Elitist qualification
C¸engelci and Sanver [10], 2010 Simple, Liberal (2 axiomatizations)
Saporiti [33], 2012 Dictatorial
Group Identification (society self-determines
how its members are classified into groups)
Author(s)/Year Decision Rules
Kasher and Rubinstein [24], 1997 Oligarchy
Houy [22], 2007 Liberal (name of group matters)
Universal, Joint and Almost joint
Miller [28], 2008 Agreement, Nomination and One-vote rules
Dimitrov and Puppe [15], 2011 Non-bossy
Table 1: Summary table of studies related to endogenous selection.
2.2 Standing framework for endogenous selection: the case of a
single group
Virtually all the cited references have approached endogeneous selection from a
dichotomous perspective. Individuals only show extreme or ‘crisp’ opinions on
the possible belongingness of each individual to the group. The resulting social
outcome (i.e., the final self-selected collectivity) suffers from the same limitation.
Thus in the case of self-selecting the members of one group (e.g., the persons
that verify a given attribute like being African-American), both in the opinions
expressed by each member of the society and in the final outcome it is assumed
that each individual either belongs or does not belong to the referred group.6
From a formal viewpoint, the case where one attribute characterizes identity
claims that the N = {1, . . . , n} agents face the problem of collectively choosing
a subset of N . And that the input for this collective selection is their indivi-
dual opinions concerning who qualifies as a member of such self-selected group.
These opinions are summarized by (crisp) profiles. A profile is an n× n matrix
P = (Pij)n×n, the cells of which are either 0 or 1 throughout. The set of all
6 As an exception, Ballester and Garc´ıa-Lapresta [4] define a restrictive concept called
“committee’s evaluation mechanism” that determines individual qualification only
in gradual terms. However this is an intermediate step prior to the construction of a
categorical “committee’s qualification mechanism” via a fixed family of thresholds.
The latter mechanism generates a subset of qualified individuals in each stage of a
recursive procedure that may not converge (cf., [4, Corollary 1]).
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such matrices is denoted by M. We say that agent i qualifies agent j if and
only if Pij = 1. And this means that in person i’s opinion, person j verifies the
attribute that defines the collective identity when Pij = 1, and does not verify
it when Pij = 0.
For each set S, let P(S) denote the set of subsets of S. Row i in P ∈ M
captures the group of qualified agents in i’s opinion. It can be easily identified
with a subset Ji(P ) ∈ P(N) through the expression: j ∈ Ji(P ) if and only if
Pij = 1. And column j describes who are the agents who qualify j.
Definition 1 (Kasher and Rubinstein [24]). A collective identity function
(CIF) is a mapping J : M −→ P(N). Thus J associates with each profile
P ∈ M a subset of N , which can be naturally identified with an n-vector of 0’s
and 1’s as done above.
CIFs attach a (crisp) subset of the society N with each collection of individ-
ual opinions on who should belong to the self-selected group. It is only natural
to introduce partial memberships (to the group that verifies the required at-
tribute) in the model by Kasher and Rubinstein. Hence in Section 3 below we
extend this framework to the fuzzy environment. There we formulate some naive
identification rules that in particular extend the fundamental solutions to the
problem of group identification as stated above. Subsequently, Section 4 below
develops new sophisticated analyses and methodologies.
3 The problem: group identification in fuzzy
environments
We proceed to model the problem of endogenous selection from a new perspec-
tive that includes the original statement of the issue. Our aim is twofold. We
introduce the problem of group identification when both the input (individual
opinions) and the outcome (aggregation opinions) are fuzzy. This is the most
general case due to the fact that the agents can express their opinions on the
degree of belongingness to the group of each agent, and then degrees of par-
tial membership are obtained as a result. Then, we present some fundamental
definitions of focal criteria that are motivated by the existing literature.
In addition we consider two partial frameworks where inputs or outputs are
crisp or fuzzy. Concretely, we introduce the issue when the input is crisp (in the
standard sense of Section 2) but the result is fuzzy. That is to say, although
the agents must be categorical on exactly who qualifies as a member of the
group, the resulting membership function of the agents is fuzzy (degrees of partial
membership are allowed). We also make some remarks on the particular case
where the opinions of the agents are fuzzy but the verdict is crisp.
3.1 Fuzzy CIFs (FCIFs)
Henceforth FS(S) denotes the fuzzy subsets (FSs) of the set S. We can embed
P(S) into FS(S) through the standard identification.
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When the N = {1, . . . , n} agents face the problem of collectively determining
a fuzzy subset of N , one should also investigate the situation where the agents
are allowed to attach partial memberships to each individual. These opinions are
summarized by fuzzy profiles.
A fuzzy profile is an n × n matrix M = (Mij)n×n, the cells of which are
numbers in the interval [0, 1].
M =
M11 . . . M1n... . . . ...
Mn1 . . . Mnn

n×n
We interpret that agent i qualifies agent j as a member of the collectivity
with degree of belongingness Mij . Now this means that in person i’s opinion,
person j verifies the attribute that defines the collective identity with a degree
of Mij . Consequently, column j of the profile M captures the opinions on the
degree of belongingness to the group of indivual j. We denote it by M (j). We
write M for the set of all n× n matrices.
Any permutation pi of the agents {1, 2, ..., k} determines a fuzzy profile piM
by permutation of the columns of M : column j of the profile piM is column pi(j)
of the profile M .
By incorporating the expression of partial memberships we allow the agents
to provide more precise information than in the standard model (cf., subsection
2.2). The recourse to fuzzy profiles permits to extend Definition 1 in the following
novel way:
Definition 2. A fuzzy CIF (FCIF) is a mapping J : M −→ FS(N), which
associates with each fuzzy profile M ∈M a fuzzy subset of N .
FCIFs express to which degree the agents belong to the self-selected group
as a function of the fuzzy opinions by all agents on that issue.
We proceed to propose the following new definitions of potentially useful
FCIFs that are inspired by respective notions from the Social Choice literature:
Definition 3. The liberal FCIF is defined as Jl : M −→ FS(N) such that for
each M ∈M,
Jl(M)(i) = Mii ∈ [0, 1], for each i ∈ N .
Definition 4. The dictatorial FCIF by agent j is defined as as follows:
Jdj : M −→ FS(N) such that for each M ∈M,
Jdj (M)(i) = Mji, for each i ∈ N .
Definition 5. The oligarchical FCIF by the set of agents O ⊆ N is defined as
Jo : M −→ FS(N) such that for each M ∈M,
Jo(M)(i) = min
j∈O
Mji, for each i ∈ N .
8 Jose´ Carlos R. Alcantud, Roc´ıo de Andre´s Calle
Definitions 3, 4 and 5 respectively extend the liberal, dictatorial and oli-
garchical CIFs originally defined by Kasher and Rubinstein [24]7. According to
the liberal FCIF, every person decides on her own degree of belongingness to
the self-selected collectivity. The dictatorial FCIF is used when one person (the
dictator) decides on everyone’s degree of belongingness to the group. Relatedly,
under the oligarchical FCIF there is a fixed part of the society that decides on
everyone’s degree of belongingness to the group by agreement on her minimum
degree of membership. Therefore the oligarchical FCIF is a dictatorial FCIF
when the oligarchy O consists of a single agent (the dictator). And the case
when the oligarchy O is the whole society produces the following remarkable
case:
Definition 6. The conjunctive FCIF is defined as Jc : M −→ FS(N) such that
for each M ∈M,
Jc(M)(i) = min
j∈N
Mji, for each i ∈ N .
It is just natural to define the counterpart of Jc as follows:
Definition 7. The benevolent FCIF is defined as Jb : M −→ FS(N) such that
for each M ∈M,
Jb(M)(i) = max
j∈N
Mji, for each i ∈ N .
The conjunctive FCIF declares that an individual belongs to the collectivity
with the larger degree of membership on which everyone in the society agrees (in
the sense: everyone believes that his or her degree of membership is at least as
large as such indicator of belongingness). Thus it implements a very restrictive
view of group identity. Relatedly, the benevolent FCIF declares that an indivi-
dual belongs to the collectivity with the larger degree of membership declared
by any of the members thus it captures a very permissive view of group identity.
The conjunctive FCIF extends the spirit of the joint or conjunctive CIF that
Houy [22, Definition 3] characterizes in the context of group identification with
partitions as inputs. In fact it is the most studied rule in the context of aggre-
gating partitions (cf., Dimitrov and Puppe [15, Section 1]). Houy’s statement
declares that two individuals are in the same group if and only if each individual
wants them to be in the same group.
We recall that the empty FS of N is 0 : N −→ [0, 1] such that 0(i) = 0 for
each i ∈ N . The full FS of N is 1 : N −→ [0, 1] such that 1(i) = 1 for each
i ∈ N . Then we can define two extreme or degenerate instances:
Definition 8. The empty FCIF is defined as 0 : M −→ FS(N) such that
0(M) = 0 for each M ∈M. The universal FCIF is defined as 1 : M −→ FS(N)
such that 1(M) = 1 for each M ∈M.
7 However in the case of the oligarchical aggregator, they rather think of a task par-
titioning all members of the society into an unlimited number of classes. This is a
different model: see e.g., Houy [22] for differences between the two approaches.
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The empty (resp., universal) FCIF declares that irrespective of the opinions
of the agents, the degree of membership of each agent to the selected group is
null (resp., full). The universal FCIF extends the spirit of the universal CIF (e.g.,
Houy [22, Definition 2]).
Now we proceed to define some new particular specifications of FCIFs that
take full advantage of the fuzzy structure of the problem.
Definition 9. Let us fix w = (w1, . . . , wn) ∈ [0, 1]n weighting vector with∑n
i=1 wi = 1. The weighted mean FCIF associated with w is defined as the
mapping Jw : M −→ FS(N) such that for each M ∈M,
Jw(M)(i) =
∑
j∈N
(wjMji), for each i ∈ N .
In particular, the average (or arithmetic) mean FCIF is defined as follows:
Ja(M)(i) =
∑
j∈N Mji
n
for each i ∈ N and M ∈M.
The average FCIF assesses the degree of membership of a person by the
average of the opinions on her belonging to the selected group by all the agents.
This means that the opinions of all agents are interchangeable. When we value
the opinions of the agents differently (e.g., due to their expertise or position or
share in a company) then we can use an adequate weighted mean FCIF instead.
Definition 10. The majoritarian FCIF is defined as Jm : M −→ FS(N) such
that for each M ∈M,
Jm(M)(i) =
{
1 if
∑
j∈N Mji >
n
2 ,∑
j∈N Mji
n otherwise.
(1)
The majoritarian FCIF imports the ethos of the majoritarian rule studied by
Samet and Schmeidler [32] and C¸engelci and Sanver [10]. It declares that when
the aggregate membership degree for one person is larger than one half of the
maximum possible aggregate, her degree of membership to the selected group is
1. Otherwise it is assessed by the arithmetic mean. Thus it can be regarded as
a correction of Ja where agents with sufficiently high total membership degree
are awarded a bonus of full membership.
Now we introduce a brief example in order to put in practice the proposed
definitions.
Example 1. Consider the following fuzzy profile M ′ ∈M:
M ′ =

0.7 0.9 0 0.5 0.6 0.2
0.6 1 0 0.4 0.7 0.5
0.8 0.8 0 0.6 0.5 0.3
0.6 0.7 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.4
0.9 0.9 0.2 0.3 0.8 0.3
0.6 0.7 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.1

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– The application of Definition 3 produces:
Jl(M
′)(1) = 0.7, Jl(M ′)(2) = 1, Jl(M ′)(3) = 0,
Jl(M
′)(4) = 0.4, Jl(M ′)(5) = 0.8, Jl(M ′)(6) = 0.1.
– The application of Definition 4 relative to agent 2 as a dictator produces:
Jd2(M
′)(1) = 0.6, Jd2(M
′)(2) = 1, Jd2(M
′)(3) = 0,
Jd2(M
′)(4) = 0.4, Jd2(M
′)(5) = 0.7, Jd2(M
′)(6) = 0.5.
– The application of Definition 5 relative to the oligarchy O = {5, 6} produces:
Jo(M
′)(1) = 0.6, Jo(M ′)(2) = 0.7, Jo(M ′)(3) = 0.2,
Jo(M
′)(4) = 0.3, Jo(M ′)(5) = 0.5, Jo(M ′)(6) = 0.1.
– The application of Definition 6 produces:
Jc(M
′)(1) = 0.6, Jc(M ′)(2) = 0.7, Jc(M ′)(3) = 0,
Jc(M
′)(4) = 0.3, Jc(M ′)(5) = 0.5, Jc(M ′)(6) = 0.1.
– The application of Definition 7 produces:
Jb(M
′)(1) = 0.9, Jb(M ′)(2) = 1, Jb(M ′)(3) = 0.3,
Jb(M
′)(4) = 0.6, Jb(M ′)(5) = 0.8, Jb(M ′)(6) = 0.5.
– The application of Definition 10 produces:
Jm(M
′)(1) = 1, Jm(M ′)(2) = 1, Jm(M ′)(3) = 0.76 ,
Jm(M
′)(4) = 0.45, Jm(M ′)(5) = 1, Jm(M ′)(6) = 0.3.
3.2 Weak Fuzzy CIFs (WFCIFs)
In this subsection we restrict the framework in Definition 2 in order to avoid
gradual opinions in the input of the model.
Definition 11. A weak fuzzy CIF (WFCIF) is a mapping J˜ : M −→ FS(N),
which associates with each profile P ∈M a fuzzy subset of N .
WFCIFs model to which degree the agents belong to the self-selected group
as a function of the categorical opinions by all agents on that issue.
Any CIF can be naturally regarded as a WFCIF. And becauseM is included
into M, the restriction of a FCIF to M naturally defines a WFCIF.
Similarly, Definitions 3 to 10 can be adapted to this framework by restricting
their domain to M. Intuitive interpretations are immediate. For example, now
the conjunctive WFCIF declares that an individual belongs to the collectivity
(with full membership) if and only if every member of the society thinks so.
Observe that the choice of partial memberships in the resulting group already
permits to use rules that would be meaningless in the context of CIFs, like
Definition 10.
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3.3 Crisp qualifications from fuzzy profiles
It is possible to specify a fourth possible framework for the endogenous selection
problem, which adds to CIFs, WFCIFs, and FCIFs. In this paper we do not ex-
plicitly investigate the case where the definition of membership to the collective
identity is crisp although the agents can evaluate each other with partial mem-
berships. Of course this is a particular instance of FCIFs where the codomain is
constrained. Specifically, it concerns mappings of the form
J : M −→ P(N)
which associate with each fuzzy profile M ∈ M a subset of N . 8 Therefore we
do not pursue this point further (see the concluding subsection 5.3).
4 FCIFs: Further specifications.
The introduction of fuzzy profiles as an input of the problem of group identifica-
tion permits to set forth completely new approaches to the issue. In particular,
the researcher has now recourse to weighted means (which generalize arithmetic
means, see Definition 9) and their extension by weighted quasi-arithmetic means
(particularly, quasi-arithmetic means), to OWA (ordered weighted average) op-
erators, and many other aggregation operators from the specialized literature like
WOWA or discrete Choquet integrals (which generalize both OWA and weighted
means). We proceed to develop some of these possibilities.
4.1 The family of Choquet-FCIFs.
Choquet integral-based aggregation seems especially appealing for the purpose
of merging individual opinions to produce collective opinions. The reason is
that it combines them in a way that not only considers individual inputs (as in
weighted means) and their magnitude (as in OWA), but also the importance of
group opinions. In our context, even if a particular opinion is deemed irrelevant
by itself, still it may become very significant in the presence of other opinions.
Discrete fuzzy measures allow the practitioner to attach degrees of relevance to
all possible collections of opinions, thus providing flexibility for our model to a
large extent.
Let us recall the elements in the definition of the discrete Choquet integral:
Definition 12. (Calvo et al. [9]) Let N = {1, . . . , n}. A discrete fuzzy mea-
sure is a set function µ : 2N −→ [0, 1] which is monotonic (i.e. µ(S) 6 µ(T )
whenever S ⊆ T ) and satisfies µ(∅) = 0, µ(N) = 1.
8 Ballester and Garc´ıa-Lapresta [3, Definition 1] use a related notion. They only con-
sider mappings that derive from “collective assessment functions” (where the final
set of qualified members results from a certain sequential process). Their companion
paper [4] makes further use of a related, more restrictive concept as a technical tool
for the construction of a crisp “committee’s qualification mechanism”.
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Definition 13. (Choquet [11], Calvo et al. [9]) The discrete Choquet inte-
gral with respect to a discrete fuzzy measure µ is the function Cµ : Rn −→ R
given by
Cµ(a1, . . . , an) =
n∑
i=1
a(i)
[
µ({j|aj > a(i)})− µ({j|aj > a(i+1)})
]
,
where a↗ = (a(1), . . . , a(n)) is a non-decreasing permutation of a = (a1, . . . , an),
and a(n+1) =∞ by convention.
Any discrete Choquet integral operator Cµ is compensative, i.e., for every
a = {a1, . . . , an} ∈ [0, 1]n,
min{a1, . . . , an} 6 Cµ(a1, . . . , an) 6 max{a1, . . . , an}.
This means that we can restrict Cµ to [0, 1]n and define Fµ : [0, 1]n −→ [0, 1]. In
fact Marichal [27] argues that Cµ can be defined unambiguously on [0, 1]n, hence
Fµ is also called a discrete Choquet integral. Now we are ready to introduce the
following novel class of FCIFs:
Definition 14. Let µ be a discrete fuzzy measure and let Fµ be given by the
restriction of Definition 13 to [0, 1]n. The Choquet-FCIF associated with µ is
defined as Jµ : M −→ FS(N) such that for each M ∈M,
Jµ(M)(i) = Fµ(M1i, ...,Mni), for each i ∈ N .
Properties of Choquet-FCIFs. In order to justify that Choquet-FCIFs per-
form well in our framework, we can import some properties from the discrete
Choquet integral operator. Let us fix the discrete fuzzy measure µ.
1. Any discrete Choquet integral operator Fµ is monotonic or increasing in
each argument:
Fµ(a) > Fµ(b)
whenever a,b ∈ [0, 1]n and a > b, i.e., ai > bi for each i. This produces the
monotonicity property of Choquet-FCIFs, a natural extension of the usual
monotonicity in Social Choice (cf., Samet and Schmeidler [32]). Formally,
for each i ∈ N :
Jµ(M)(i) 6 Jµ(M ′)(i) when Mji 6M ′ji for each j = 1, . . . , n.
Monotonicity guarantees the following good features:
(a) For any given fuzzy profile, if the degrees of membership of individual i
are not smaller (across the members of the society) than the degrees of
membership of individual j, then the degree of membership of i is not
smaller than the degree of membership of j.
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(b) If we study two fuzzy profiles and the degrees of membership of an
individual are not smaller under the first profile (across the members
of the society), then her degree of membership under the first profile is
not smaller than her degree of membership under the second one.
2. The fact that Choquet integrals are compensative implies that the degree of
membership of an individual is neither lower that her lowest evaluation nor
higher than her highest evaluation. We call this property of Choquet-FCIFs
compensativeness.
3. It is known that any discrete Choquet integral operator Fµ is idempotent:
for every a ∈ [0, 1], Fµ(a, . . . , a) = a.
Therefore if all persons in the society agree that the degree of membership
of an individual is a then it is socially accepted that a is her degree of mem-
bership. Borrowing terminology from Social Choice, this is the unanimity
property of Choquet-FCIFs. In particular, Jµ(M)(i) = 0 if column i of M
is constantly 0, and Jµ(M)(i) = 1 if column i of M is constantly 1.
4. Any discrete Choquet integral operator Fµ is stable for admissible positive
lineal transformations 9
Fµ(r · a1 + s, . . . , r · an + s) = r · Fµ(a1, . . . , an) + s,
when a = {a1, . . . , an} ∈ [0, 1]n, for r > 0 and s ∈ R such that r·aj+s ∈ [0, 1]
for each j = 1, . . . , n.
Hence Choquet-FCIFs inherit a property of stability for positive linear trans-
formations. Formally, for each i ∈ N :
Jµ(M)(i) = r · Jµ(M ′)(i) + s
when Mji = rM
′
ji + s for each j = 1, . . . , n, r > 0, s ∈ R with Mji,M ′ji ∈
[0, 1] for each j = 1, . . . , n.
5. Any discrete Choquet integral operator Fµ is comonotonic additive:
Fµ(a1 + b1, . . . , an + bn) = F
µ(a1, . . . , an) + F
µ(b1, . . . , bn)
when a,b ∈ [0, 1]n are two comonotonic vectors. We recall that a,b ∈
[0, 1]n are comonotonic if there exists a permutation pi of N such that
api(1) 6 api(2) 6 . . . 6 api(n) and bpi(1) 6 bpi(2) 6 . . . 6 bpi(n).
This property ensures that Choquet-FCIFs are comonotonicity additive. For-
mally, for each i ∈ N :
Jµ(M +M ′)(i) = Jµ(M)(i) + Jµ(M ′)(i)
when columns M i and M ′i are comonotonic. Obviously, we say that M i and
M ′i are comonotonic when there is pi, a permutation of N , such that
Mpi(1)i 6Mpi(2)i 6 . . . 6Mpi(n)i and M ′pi(1)i 6M ′pi(2)i 6 . . . 6M ′pi(n)i
9 This property is called homogeneity of degree 1 or ratio scale invariance when s = 0
[25].
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or equivalently, when
(Mji −Mki)(M ′ji −M ′ki) > 0 for each j, k ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
6. It is well known that the discrete Choquet integral is uniquely defined by
its values at the vertices of the unit cube [0, 1]n, i.e., at the points a =
(a1, . . . , an) such that ai ∈ {0, 1} for each i. There are 2n such points, the
same as the number of values that determine the fuzzy measure µ. From
this property we deduce that Jµ is completely determined by its restriction
to M, the collection of all crisp individual profiles.
In addition, the Choquet-FCIF verifies other interesting properties. For fur-
ther use we emphasize the following one:
7. Independence: If M and M ′ are two fuzzy profiles such that their respective
columns i coincide, then the degree of membership of agent i to the group
identity is the same under both profiles: Jµ(M)(i) = Jµ(M ′)(i). 10
Example 2. Consider the following fuzzy profile M ∈M:
M =
 0.18 0.10 0.40.16 0.12 0.5
0.10 0.18 0.4

We assume the following fuzzy measure: µ({1}) = µ({2}) = 0.45, µ({3}) = 0.3,
µ({1, 2}) = 0.5, and µ({1, 3}) = µ({2, 3}) = 0.9 (together with the compulsory
µ(∅) = 0 and µ({1, 2, 3}) = 1). The fact µ({1}) + µ({2}) > µ({1, 2}) means
redundancy between criteria of agents 1 and 2. The fact µ({1}) + µ({3}) <
µ({1, 3}), resp., µ({2}) + µ({3}) < µ({2, 3}), means synergism between criteria
of agents 1 and 3, resp., of agents 2 and 3.
Let us compute the degrees of membership of the agents to the group by the
Choquet-FCIF associated with the aforementioned µ. It is a matter of calculation
to show that:
– The degree of membership of the first person is
Jµ(M)(1) = 0.1 + 0.06µ({1, 2}) + 0.02µ({1}) = 0.139.
– The degree of membership of the second person is
Jµ(M)(2) = 0.1 + 0.02µ({2, 3}) + 0.06µ({3}) = 0.136.
– The degree of membership of the third person is
Jµ(M)(3) = 0.4 + 0.1µ({2}) = 0.445.
10 In subsection 5.1 we refer to the traditional statement and interpretation of the
properties of unanimity and independence (in the analysis of a remarkable impossi-
bility theorem in the traditional framework).
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4.2 The family of OWA-FCIFs.
As a particular case of the discrete Choquet integral, we can utilize OWAs as
averaging aggregation functions (cf., Yager [38]) in order to define a particular
subclass of the Choquet-FCIF called OWA-FCIF. OWA operators allow us to
calculate aggregate values by weighting the supplied values in relation to their
relative ordering. OWA operators are special cases of Choquet integrals with
respect to symmetric fuzzy measures, or in other words, symmetric Choquet
integral operators (cf., Calvo, Mayor and Mesiar [9]). Hence we now recall the
concept of an OWA operator:
Definition 15 (Yager [38]). Let w = (w1, . . . , wn) ∈ [0, 1]n be a weighting
vector such that
∑n
i=1 wi = 1. The ordered weighted averaging (OWA) operator
associated with w is the function Fw : Rn −→ R defined by
Fw(a1, . . . , an) =
n∑
i=1
wi bi for each (a1, . . . , an) ∈ Rn,
where bi is the i-th largest element in the collection of (possibly repeated) values
{a1, . . . , an}.
We are ready to define the notion of OWA-FCIF.
Definition 16. Let us fix w = (w1, . . . , wn) ∈ [0, 1]n weighting vector with∑n
i=1 wi = 1, and let F
w be given by Definition 15. The OWA-FCIF associated
with w is defined as Jw : M −→ FS(N) such that for each M ∈M,
Jw(M)(i) = Fw(M1i, ...,Mni), for each i ∈ N .
Of course, many noteworthy examples arise from concrete specifications of
the weight vector. The case w = ( 1n , . . . ,
1
n ) yields the average mean FCIF:
see Figure 1. This fact replicates the property that the average mean operator
is an OWA operator with equal weights. The case w = (0, 0, . . . , 1) yields the
conjunctive FCIF that evaluates the degree of membership of each agent by his
or her smallest qualification by the group. The case w = (1, 0, . . . , 0) evaluates
the degree of membership of each agent by his or her highest qualification by the
group thus it captures a very permissive view of group identity by the benevolent
FCIF. Nevertheless, neither the liberal nor the dictatorial FCIFs are particular
cases of OWA-FCIFs. Table 2 summarizes these peculiarities.
Properties of OWA-FCIFs. Of course, some properties of OWA-FCIFs are
inherited from properties of Choquet-FCIFs (e.g., monotonicity, compensative-
ness, idempotency, et cetera). But we can also import relevant properties of
the OWA operator in order to assure that OWA-FCIFs have certain distinctive
behavioral attributes in our setting:
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Weight vector Decision Rule
w = ( 1
n
, . . . , 1
n
) Average mean FCIF
w = (0, 0, . . . , 1) Conjunctive FCIF
w = (1, 0, . . . , 0) Benevolent FCIF
Table 2: Summary table of particular examples of OWA-FCIFs according to their
weight vectors.
1. Any OWA operator Fw is σ-homogeneous of degree 1:
Fw(λa) = λFw(b)
whenever vector b is a permutation of vector a and λ > 0. This implies
that the degree of membership of an individual whose evaluations are e.g.,
the result of systematically halving the evaluations of another individual (in
any order), is half the degree of membership of the latter person. We call this
property of OWA-FCIFs σ-homogeneity of degree 1. It implies homogeneity
of degree 1 when σ is the identity.
2. Due to σ-homogeneity of degree 1, the opinions of all agents are equally
important. Borrowing terminology from Social Choice, this is the anonymity
property: Jw(M)(i) is invariant by permutations of the evaluations in column
i of M .
In addition, the OWA-FCIF verifies independence as well.
Remark 1. We address the reader to Calvo and Beliakov [8] for exhaustive infor-
mation on the problem of the identification of weights in aggregation operators.
Example 3. Let us revisit the fuzzy profile M ′ ∈ M defined in Example 1. In
order to apply Definition 16, we use the following rearrangements of the columns
of M ′:
– b1 = (0.9, 0.8, 0.7, 0.6, 0.6, 0.6) which is used to produce
Jw(M ′)(1) = Fw(M ′11, ...,M
′
n1).
– b2 = (1, 0.9, 0.9, 0.8, 0.7, 0.7), which is used to produce
Jw(M ′)(2) = Fw(M ′12, ...,M
′
n2).
– b3 = (0.3, 0.2, 0.2, 0, 0, 0), which is used to produce
Jw(M ′)(3) = Fw(M ′13, ...,M
′
n3).
– b4 = (0.6, 0.5, 0.5, 0.4, 0.4, 0.3), which is used to produce
Jw(M ′)(4) = Fw(M ′14, ...,M
′
n4).
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– b5 = (0.8, 0.7, 0.6, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5), which is used to produce
Jw(M ′)(5) = Fw(M ′15, ...,M
′
n5).
– b6 = (0.5, 0.4, 0.3, 0.3, 0.2, 0.1), which is used to produce
Jw(M ′)(6) = Fw(M ′16, ...,M
′
n6).
Now it is simple to compute the degrees of membership of the agents to
the group for any OWA-FCIF, i.e., for any possible weight vector w . Thus for
example:
– The average mean FCIF, Ja, uses w = (
1
6 , . . . ,
1
6 ) and the degree of mem-
bership of each agent is shown in Table 3.
Table 3: OWA-FCIF degrees of membership with w = ( 1
6
, . . . , 1
6
) .
1 2 3 4 5 6
Ja(M
′)(i) 0.70 0.83 0.12 0.45 0.6 0.3
– When w = (0, 0.3, 0.3, 0.2, 0.2, 0) the degree of membership of each agent is
given in Table 4.
Table 4: OWA-FCIF degrees of membership with w = (0, 0.3, 0.3, 0.2, 0.2, 0) .
1 2 3 4 5 6
Jw(M ′)(i) 0.69 0.84 0.08 0.46 0.59 0.31
4.3 The family of WOWA-FCIFs.
In an OWA operator, weights establish the importance of a value in relation to
other values. This is done regardless of the agent or source that emitted the value.
However in many group decision mechanisms, agents play different roles and it is
sensible to propose procedures that allow for these disparities. In our context, to
that purpose we can use WOWA operators which are not necessarily invariant
to permutations of the membership degrees attached (to a fixed person). By
the recourse to a WOWA operator we can give personalized importance to each
member’s opinions. This requires the introduction of an additional input, namely,
the weights p that correspond to the agents (in addition to the weights w that
graduate the importance of the evaluations in relation to other evaluations).
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Definition 17. Let p = (p1, . . . , pn) ∈ [0, 1]n and w = (w1, . . . , wn) ∈ [0, 1]n
be weighting vectors with
∑n
i=1 pi = 1,
∑n
i=1 wi = 1. The WOWA-FCIF
associated with p and w is defined as Jw,p : M −→ FS(N) such that for
each M ∈M,
Jw,p(M)(i) = Jw,p(Mσ(1)i, . . . ,Mσ(n)i) =
n∑
j=1
λjMσ(j)i for each i ∈ N
where σ : {1, . . . , n} → {1, . . . , n} is a permutation function such that
Mσ(1)i >Mσ(2)i > . . . >Mσ(n)i and the weights λi are defined as
λi = f
 i∑
j=1
pσ(j)
− f
i−1∑
j=1
pσ(j)

where f is a non-decreasing function that interpolates the points ( in ,
∑i
j=1 wj)
together with the point (0, 0), with the proviso that f is the identity when the
identity interpolates these points.
Properties of WOWA-FCIFs. We can also import properties of the WOWA
operator to assure that the WOWA-FCIF has certain behavioral attributes in
our setting.
1. Suppose p = ( 1n , . . . ,
1
n ). Then the WOWA-FCIF is an OWA-FCIF associa-
ted with w (because Torra [34, Proposition 5] establishes the corresponding
property for WOWA operators: see Figure 1). Therefore, when in addition
w = ( 1n , . . . ,
1
n ) we obtain the average mean FCIF (AM-FCIF). If w =
(0, . . . , 0, 1), we obtain the conjunctive FCIF. If w = (1, 0, . . . , 0), we obtain
the benevolent FCIF.
2. Suppose w = ( 1n , . . . ,
1
n ). Then the WOWA-FCIF is called weighted mean
FCIF associated with the weighting vector p (WM-FCIF). Torra [34, Propo-
sition 4] establishes the corresponding property for WOWA operators: see
Figure 1. Of course, when in addition p = ( 1n , . . . ,
1
n ) we obtain the average
mean FCIF.
3. When p verifies pi = 1, pj = 0 for each j 6= i, the WOWA-FCIF is the
dictatorial FCIF by agent i (because Torra [34, Proposition 6 (5)] establishes
the corresponding property for WOWA operators).
4. Any WOWA operator Fw,p is homogeneous of degree 1 (cf., Llamazares
[25]):
Fw,p(λa) = λFw,p(a)
We call the induced property of WOWA-FCIFs homogeneity of degree 1: This
implies that the degree of membership of an individual whose evaluations are
e.g., the result of systematically halving the evaluations of another individual
(in any order), is half the degree of membership of the latter person.
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5. Any WOWA operator is monotonic (Torra [34, Proposition 6 (4)]). This
yields the monotonicity property of WOWA-FCIFs, a natural extension of
the monotonicity property of OWA-FCIFs whose interpretation has been
given above.
6. Any WOWA operator is compensative (Torra [34, Proposition 6 (1)]). This
property assures that WOWA-FCIFs verify compensativeness defined as in
the case of OWA-FCIFs. Therefore, WOWA-FCIFs verify the unanimity
property that extends the corresponding definition for OWA-FCIFs.
Fig. 1: Relationships among Choquet-FCIFs, WOWA-FCIFs, OWA-FCIFs, WM-FCIFs
and AM-FCIFs. Grabisch et al. [21, Proposition 5.50] permits to identify the precise
conditions that guarantee (*) and (**).
Remark 2. Torra and Lv [36] introduce a definition that emphasizes the role
of the interpolation method used in an OWA operator. They define WOWA-
consistent interpolation methods and study to which extent the selected inter-
polation method influences the result of the WOWA operator. Furthermore,
already Torra [35] explained that it is also possible to determine WOWAs from
a quantifier and the weighting vector p = (p1, . . . , pn) ∈ [0, 1]n. Therefore we
could also define a WOWA-FCIF associated with p and the quantifier Q (Yager
[39]). We skip this trivial modification of Definition 17.
Example 4. Consider the following fuzzy profile M ′′ ∈M:
M ′′ =

1 0 0.4 0.7 0.5
0.8 0 0.6 0.5 0.3
0.7 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.4
0.9 0.2 0.3 0.8 0.3
0.7 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.1

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M ′′ is the fuzzy subprofile of M ′ defined in Example 1 that disregards the first
member of the society.
We assume that the importance of the opinions of the current members of the
society are weighed by p = (0.3, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.1). We also use w = (0, 13 ,
1
3 ,
1
3 , 0)
under which central assessments are equally valued and extreme values are dis-
carded. We follow the exposition in Llamazares [25, Example 1] and choose the
following function in order to interpolate the points (0, 0), (0.2, 0), (0.4, 1/3),
(0.6, 2/3), (0.8, 1), and (1, 1):
f(x) =

0, if x ≤ 0.2,
5
3
x− 1
3
, if 0.2 < x < 0.8,
1, if x ≥ 0.8.
Fig. 2: A non-decreasing function associated with w = (0, 1
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
, 0).
Now in order to evaluate the degree of membership of each individual to the
collective identity, we proceed as follows.
– Member 1. We use the following rearrangement of M ′′(1), the first column
of M ′′:
(Mσ(1)1,Mσ(2)1,Mσ(3)1,Mσ(4)1,Mσ(5)1) = (1, 0.9, 0.8, 0.7, 0.7)
whose associated permutation of the p vector is p1 = p. Now λ1 = λ4 =
1
6 ,
λ2 =
1
3 = λ3, λ5 = 0. The degree of membership of this person is
Jw,p(M ′′)(1) =
1
6
· 1 + 1
3
· 0.9 + 1
3
· 0.8 + 1
6
· 0.7 + 0 = 0.85
Collective identity in fuzzy environment 21
– Member 2. We use the following rearrangement of M ′′(2):
(Mσ(1)2,Mσ(2)2,Mσ(3)2,Mσ(4)2,Mσ(5)2) = (0.3, 0.2, 0.2, 0, 0)
whose associated permutation of the p vector is p2 = (0.1, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.3).
Now λ1 = 0, λ2 =
1
6 , λ3 =
1
3 = λ4, λ5 =
1
6 . The degree of membership of
this person is
Jw,p(M ′′)(2) = 0.3 · 0 + 1
6
· 0.2 + 1
3
· 0.2 + 1
3
· 0 + 1
3
· 0 = 0.1
– Member 3. We use the following rearrangement of M ′′(3):
(Mσ(1)3,Mσ(2)3,Mσ(3)3,Mσ(4)3,Mσ(5)3) = (0.6, 0.5, 0.4, 0.4, 0.3)
whose associated permutation of the p vector is p3 = (0.2, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.2).
Now λ1 = 0, λ2 =
1
6 , λ3 =
1
3 , λ4 =
1
2 , λ5 = 0. The degree of membership of
this person is
Jw,p(M ′′)(3) = 0.6 · 0 + 1
6
· 0.5 + 1
3
· 0.4 + 1
2
· 0.4 + 0 · 0.3 ≈ 0.417
– Member 4. We use the following rearrangement of M ′′(4):
(Mσ(1)4,Mσ(2)4,Mσ(3)4,Mσ(4)4,Mσ(5)4) = (0.8, 0.7, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5)
whose associated permutation of the p vector is p4 = (0.2, 0.3, 0.2, 0.2, 0.1).
Now λ1 = 0, λ2 =
1
2 , λ3 =
1
3 , λ4 =
1
6 , λ5 = 0. The degree of membership of
this person is
Jw,p(M ′′)(4) = 0.8 · 0 + 1
2
· 0.7 + 1
3
· 0.5 + 1
6
· 0.5 + 0 · 0.5 = 0.6
– Member 5. We use the following rearrangement of M ′′(5):
(Mσ(1)5,Mσ(2)5,Mσ(3)5,Mσ(4)5,Mσ(5)5) = (0.5, 0.4, 0.3, 0.3, 0.1)
whose associated permutation of the p vector is p5 = (0.3, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.1).
Now λ1 =
1
6 , λ2 =
1
3 , λ3 =
1
3 , λ4 =
1
6 , λ5 = 0. The degree of membership of
this person is
Jw,p(M ′′)(5) =
1
6
· 0.5 + 1
3
· 0.4 + 1
3
· 0.3 + 1
6
· 0.3 + 0 · 0.1 ≈ 0.367
Remark 3. Damiani et al. [12] give another interesting use of a linear interpo-
lation in their analysis of a WOWA-based aggregation technique on individual
trust values on metadata assertions.
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5 Conclusions and future research
We have reconsidered the problem of self-selection of individuals in a group with
respect to a given attribute. Since these attributes are usually vague or impre-
cise, it seems just natural to approach the problem from a fuzzy rather than a
crisp or categorical position. Miller [28, Subsection 3.1] tacitly recognized this
need when he claimed the following as a desideratum: “A possible extension to
the group identification model would be to weaken the assumption that opinions
about qualification are binary by replacing the domain of possible opinions from
{0, 1} to an arbitrary totally ordered set D containing minimal and maximal el-
ements 0 and 1.” We are not aware of any contribution that explores this route
in its generality. Here we go beyond Miller’s goal by defining the new problem
of collective identification in a framework where the agents express their judge-
ments and are ultimately qualified through partial memberships. Other weaker
frameworks are possible, inclusive of the standard case where both the opin-
ions and the resulting memberships are crisp. Our main new tool of analysis
is the notion of FCIFs. The existing literature provided some focal rules that
can be naturally extended to the new framework. But the richer structure that
we have allowed in our model permits to be more flexible in the assessments,
which reduces losses of information. Particularly interesting are Choquet- and
WOWA-FCIFs, which include OWA-FCIFs. Not only the membership assess-
ments received can be weighted in relation to other evaluations, but also the
opinions of the agents can be treated differently (e.g., to recognize seniorship)
or corrected from interactions among opinions (e.g., to counteract lobbies).
In order to endorse the advantages of our model, we point out at two addi-
tional developments. In subsection 5.1 we see that its versatility permits to avoid
a well-known impossibility in the traditional approach to endogenous selection.
Then subsection 5.2 explores the possibility of producing characterizations of
relevant classes of FCIFs. In subsection 5.3 we give some final remarks.
5.1 A positive escape to Kasher and Rubinstein’s impossibility
theorem
In their seminal contribution, Kasher and Rubinstein [24] proved the following
result:
Theorem 1. The only CIF∗’s that verify consensus and independence are the
dictatorships.
According to their Section 5, a CIF∗ is a function that assigns a proper subset
of N to every profile of proper subsets of N . I.e., it is assumed that there is a
consensus in the group that the self-selected subgroup of qualified members must
be a proper subset of N . The consensus property captures the meaning of our
unanimity property (cf., subsection 4.1). It means that if there is an agreement
among all individuals that a certain individual qualifies (resp., does not qualify)
as a member, then the CIF∗ determines that this member belongs (resp., does not
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belong) to the endogenously selected group. And in their words, independence
means that whether i qualifies or not depends only on how individuals qualify
i. Thus it coincides with the meaning that we attach to this term.
In order to show that the fuzzy view of the problem permits to escape this
astringent result, we observe the following. For any weight vector with non-
zero weights throughout, let us restrict the associated WMFCIF to the domain
M − {M(0),M(1)}. Hence we only exclude the profile that evaluates everyone
with a 0, and the profile that evaluates everyone with a 1, from the domain. It is
easy to check that our restricted WMFCIF verifies consensus and independence,
and it neither qualifies everyone with full membership nor with null membership.
Thus it provides a fuzzy restatement of a CIF∗ on a less reduced domain whereas
it is clearly non-dictatorial.
5.2 On the characterization of classes of FCIFs
Ir order to favor prospective uses in Social Choice it seems interesting to produce
axiomatic characterizations of the most important new definitions of FCIFs. This
follows the tradition of the works mentioned above in the extended approach to
group identification (cf., [16], [22], [24], [28], [32], [33], among others). To that
purpose the researcher could avail herself of either existing or novel characteri-
zations of aggregation operators to the framework of our contribution.
Let us exemplify this technique with a characterization of the Choquet-
FCIFs. We can take advantage of the characterization of the Choquet integral
defined on [0, 1]n (cf., Marichal [27, Theorem 3.1]). Marichal proves that it is
the only aggregation function from [0, 1]n to R that is stable for the admissi-
ble positive linear transformations (SPL), increasing in each opinion (IN) and
comonotonic additive (CoAdd). This result easily produces the desired charac-
terization in terms of the following adapted axiomatics:
Theorem 2. An FCIF J : M −→ FS(N) is a Choquet-FCIF if and only if it
verifies Independence, SSPL, SIN and SCoAdd.
The new properties that we use in this characterization are translations of
the aforementioned properties from [27, Theorem 3.1 (i)] to our statement, in
the following terms.
Definition 18. An FCIF J : M −→ FS(N) verifies:
1. Social stability for the admissible positive linear transformations (SSPL) if
for each i ∈ N :
J(M)(i) = r · J(M ′)(i) + s
when Mji = rM
′
ji + s for each j = 1, . . . , n, r > 0, s ∈ R with Mji,M ′ji ∈
[0, 1] for each j = 1, . . . , n.
2. Socially monotonic or increasing in each opinion (SIN) if for each i ∈ N :
J(M)(i) 6 J(M ′)(i) when Mji 6M ′ji for each j = 1, . . . , n.
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3. Socially comonotonic additive (SCoAdd) if for each i ∈ N :
J(M +M ′)(i) = J(M)(i) + J(M ′)(i)
when columns M i and M ′i are comonotonic. We say that M i and M ′i are
comonotonic when there is pi, a permutation of N , such that
Mpi(1)i 6Mpi(2)i 6 . . . 6Mpi(n)i and M ′pi(1)i 6M ′pi(2)i 6 . . . 6M ′pi(n)i
or equivalently, when
(Mji −Mki)(M ′ji −M ′ki) > 0 for each i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
It is crucial to observe that Independence must be introduced in order to
grant that the n capacities obtained by invoking [27, Theorem 3.1] coincide
accross agents.
We do not intend to make an extensive analysis of this topic. The interested
reader can easily adapt other sets of axioms that jointly characterize the Choquet
integral, e.g., SPL, IN, and BOM or bisymmetric for orderable matrices: cf., [27,
Theorem 3.1 (ii)].
With respect to other classes of FCIFs, let us mention that the literature has
provided characterizations of the OWA operator defined on Rn (cf., Grabisch et
al. [21, Theorem 5.46]). An adapted characterization to [0, 1]n would eventually
produce a characterization of OWA-FCIFs by following the technique above.
Obviously, this technique also applies to any other related aggregation operator.
5.3 Questions for future research
The issue of how identity affects economic outcomes has been attempted in
Akerlof and Kranton [1] from a different perspective. Their purpose is to in-
corporate the psychology and sociology of identity into the study. Nevertheless
the formal approach to which we adhere seems not to be linked to subsequent
economic analyses in the literature. Hence a challenge (in either crisp or fuzzy
statements of the collective identity problem) is its implementation into economic
environments.
Another line of inspection is the investigation of procedures that produce
crisp qualifications from fuzzy profiles (in the sense of subsection 3.3) on the basis
of FCIFs. For such procedures it would be interesting to know which properties
can be transferred from the original FCIF to the new procedure with restricted
codomain P(N).
Relatedly, it seems plausible to introduce the fuzzy techniques into the ana-
lysis of group identification with c prefixed classes or indetermined number of
classes where the names of the groups matter (cf., Subsection 2.1 for the crisp
motivation).
We expect to conduct further investigations of these issues in the future.
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